There is a pattern no one names out loud, and it has repeated so reliably for fifteen years that I now treat it as a law of cloud physics: attackers monetize every new cloud resource in the same order. First they want raw capacity for whatever pays — spam relays, DDoS, credential stuffing. Then, when a new asset class gets valuable enough, they mine it. We lived through the cryptojacking era, where a leaked key meant your account quietly spun up a fleet of GPU instances to mint Monero on your dime. The novelty this time is not the attack. It is the speed. AI inference is the newest substrate, and it did not arrive as an emerging threat. It arrived pre industrialized.
The pattern, and why this iteration is different
If you have been doing this long enough, you can recite the sequence from memory: raw compute abuse, then cryptomining, then credential abuse and data theft, and now unauthorized AI inference. Each new layer rides on the same root cause — exposed credentials and internet facing endpoints that get scanned within hours of going live. What should concern your security team is not that AI inference joined the list. It is how fast it commercialized. Cryptojacking took years to develop a resale market. LLMjacking skipped the awkward adolescent phase entirely and showed up with a supply chain, a pricing model, and a storefront.
Sysdig coined the term “LLMjacking” in May 2024, and the framing was deliberate: this is the new cryptomining. Attackers are not primarily after your data. They are after your inference cycles — your paid access to frontier models — and the bill lands on you. Sysdig called it early. What happened next proved them right faster than anyone expected.
What changed: Operation Bizarre Bazaar
In early 2026, Sysdig and Pillar Security reported Operation Bizarre Bazaar, the first LLMjacking campaign with systematic attribution, a full supply chain, and confirmed marketplace monetization. The numbers are not subtle. Honeypots captured roughly 35,000 attack sessions between December 2025 and January 2026 — about 972 a day. This is not a proof of concept in a researcher’s lab. It is a running business.
The operation breaks into three stages, and each one is professionalized:
- Automated recon. Shodan and Censys sweeps for exposed endpoints — unauthenticated Ollama on port 11434, unauthenticated vLLM on port 8000, accessible MCP endpoints, and the forgotten dev and staging AI environments that nobody put behind auth.
- Quality based validation. Captured access is graded. Which models can this credential reach? What is the quota? A stolen key to a GPT class or Claude class model is worth more than one to a toy endpoint, and the operators price accordingly.
- Commercial resale. A marketplace called “silver.inc” resells access to 30+ LLM providers at 40 to 60 percent discounts, brokered through Telegram and Discord and paid in crypto and PayPal.
Read that last line again. There is a storefront. The Cloud Security Alliance research note documents the same marketplace dynamics. This is the detail that should change how you brief your leadership: your stolen Bedrock access is a SKU.
Why AI beats crypto as a target
Two things make AI inference a better target than cryptomining ever was, and both are economic.
First, the exposure is uniquely steep. With cryptojacking, your blast radius was bounded by how many instances the attacker could launch before you noticed, and the yield per instance was mediocre. Inference has no such ceiling. Sysdig estimated up to roughly $46,000 a day for Bedrock credential theft at peak quota, and one assessment projects north of $100,000 a day against the most capable frontier models. There is no mining rig that burns money that fast.
Second — and this is the part that keeps me up at night — it hides in plain sight at the API layer. A cryptomining fleet looks anomalous: unusual instance types, sustained 100 percent CPU, outbound traffic to mining pools. A bedrock:InvokeModel call from a compromised but valid IAM identity is indistinguishable at the API layer from legitimate use. There is no malformed packet, no weird binary, no new instance family. Fortinet’s threat research lays out the typical chain, and it is depressingly clean: a leaked long lived IAM key, a freshly created IAM user, a Marketplace model subscription, and then invocation. Every step uses legitimate APIs. Your tooling sees an authorized principal doing authorized things. The only tell is the bill.
The MCP twist: from inflated bill to lateral movement
Here is where a billing problem becomes a breach problem. By late January 2026, a separate MCP focused campaign accounted for roughly 60 percent of honeypot attack traffic. That shift matters because of what MCP servers do: they bridge AI models to file systems, databases, and internal tooling.
An exposed MCP endpoint is not just unauthorized inference. It is a foothold. Compromise one and you are not stealing cycles anymore — you are reading files and querying databases through the model’s tool connections. The “internal tooling” you wired up to make your agents useful is exactly the thing that turns LLMjacking into lateral movement. The economic abuse was the opening move. The MCP vector is the one that gets you a breach disclosure, not just a surprise invoice.
Hype check
So is this just cryptojacking repainted for the AI news cycle? I went in expecting to say yes, and mostly I have to say no.
The mechanism is identical — exposed credentials, internet facing endpoints, automated recon. If that is your definition, then fine, it is the same attack. But two things are genuinely worse. The economics are an order of magnitude steeper, because inference meters money faster than any mining rig. And the MCP blast radius means the worst case is no longer a cleanup and a credit from your account team — it is data exfiltration through a trusted bridge.
Where the hype deflates is the defense. There is no exotic new control to buy. The fundamentals that would have stopped cryptojacking in 2019 stop LLMjacking in 2026. That is the uncomfortable truth: we keep rebuilding the same house on the same unlocked foundation and acting surprised when a new kind of burglar walks in.
Practical takeaways
- Fix credential hygiene first. Short lived, role assumed credentials everywhere. No never expiring admin keys. The entire Bizarre Bazaar supply chain starts with a leaked long lived key — kill the input and you kill the campaign.
- Assume breach for anything internet exposed. If an Ollama, vLLM, or MCP endpoint is reachable, treat it as already scanned. It will be found within hours. Put auth in front of it or take it off the internet.
- Treat cost anomalies as security signals. Wire FinOps to SecOps. A sudden Bedrock spend spike is not a billing ticket — it is potentially your earliest and sometimes only detection signal. Alert on it like an IDS hit.
- Govern your model and MCP endpoints. Inventory them, authenticate them, rate limit them, and monitor them. An MCP server with filesystem access and no auth is a breach waiting for a Shodan hit.
- Turn on the logs that are off by default. CloudTrail everywhere, and Bedrock model invocation logging, which is not enabled by default. If an invocation is indistinguishable at the API layer from legitimate use, the invocation logs are the only place you will ever see it.
The attackers have already built the marketplace. The question for your security team is not whether your AI resources are interesting to them — they are, and they are priced. The question is whether the boring fundamentals are in place before the recon sweep finds you. They almost never are. Start there.